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WARRANTS OF ATTORNEY TO CONFESS JUDGMENT-VALIDITY
-WHERE SIGNATURE SHOULD BE PLACED-CONTRACTS"FINE PRINT" CLAUSES
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has further limited the effectiveness of
"fine print" clauses in contracts embodying a warrant of attorney to confess
judgment in Frantz Tractor Co., Inc., v. Wyoming Valley Nursery, 384 Pa. 213,
120 A.2d 303 (1956).
Defendant rented equipment from the plaintiff under a written lease.
Provisions were set out on both sides of the lease. On the side signed by the
defendant appeared the following term: "This Contract and all Terms and
Conditions, rights and remedies herein contained and set forth on the reverse
side hereof shall bind the parties hereto, their and each of their heirs, executors,
and administrators, successors, and assigns." On the unsigned reverse side were
twenty-one separate paragraphs "so finely printed as not to be readily legible
and so close in type as to be blurred in places." 1 The latter half of the
eighteenth paragraph contained a warrant of attorney which authorized a confession of judgment against the lessee for almost any kind of alleged breach and
which also provided that the lessor's determination of the damages shall be
final and conclusive. After defendant defaulted in his payments, plaintiff
confessed judgment against him. Defendant then moved to strike off the judgment, contending that a warrant of attorney to confess judgment must be clear
and explicit not only in words, but in the grant of authority itself, and also
that where a form offer is framed to mislead, the misleading provisions should
be ignored. The lower court granted the motion on the ground that the face
of the instrument had no warranty of attorney to confess judgment. On appeal,
plaintiff contended that the provisions set forth on the signed face of the lease
which referred "to the rights and remedies . . . on the reverse side", was a
sufficient warrant of attorney. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that
a warrant of attorney to confess judgment is an extraordinary power and must,
therefore, be self-sustaining; to be self-sustaining, the required signature
must specifically relate or refer to the warrant and may not be implied extrinsically from the instrument. Accordingly, the lower court's order striking off the
confessed judgment was affirmed.
Where a party signing a contract fails to find out what was stated therein,
he may still show that he was fraudulently misled. 2 Generally, however, one
1384 Pa. at 215, 120 A.2d at 304.
2 Ashland Towson Corporation v. Kasunic, 110 Pa. Super. 496, 168 Atd. 502 (1933); Stauffer and Stauffer v. Gebhart, 103 Pa. Super. 300, 157 At. 517 (1931).
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who has the capacity and opportunity to read a contract, who is not misled as
to its contents, and who is not in a confidential relation, cannot avoid his contractual obligation. In order to uphold the integrity of, and give stability to,
written agreements, every contracting party has the duty to learn and know
the contents of the agreement he signs.' He also owes this duty because the
other party may perform and shape his action in reliance on the expressed terms.
Where a warrant of attorney to confess judgment is involved, however,
Pennsylvania has relaxed this stringent rule because the warrant confers plenary
power on the holder to adjudicate his own claims. Therefore, the Pennsylvania
courts have required the signature conferring this power to refer specifically
to the provisions creating the warrant for the warrant to be effective.' Even
though there are cases where warrants of attorney to confess judgment contained in non-specific and general references were held valid, it is submitted
that the issues framed by the parties in those cases did not involve the validity
of the warrants.' The indirect upholding of those warrants may thus be regarded as not necessary to the holding of the case.
The basis given by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court for the present ruling
is to be found in the Act of February 24, 1806,6 and prior case law. The Act
requires the prothonotary to enter judgment on behalf of the holder of a confession warrant only if the authority to confess judgment is in a written
instrument." In Solazo v. Boyle 8 the power to confess judgment was held not
subject to the rule that a written contract may be orally modified in a subsequent
transaction. The warrant must be in writing because of the extraordinary
power it confers. This Act has also been used in the cases to support the
a 12 AM. JUR., Contracts § 137 (1938). This rule is so firmly entrenched in the ordinary situation that it goes to the extent of binding an illiterate or a blind man who signs an instrument, be.
cause his failure to obtain a reading and explanation of the contract is such gross negligence that
he is estopped from saying that he was ignorant of the terms. Moreover, a signer is ordinarily bound
if the contract refers to other papers since he had the chance to get an explanation. Also see Commonwealth, to Use of Liberty Nat. Bank of 'Pittston v. Gudaitis et al., 323 Pa. 110, 186 At. 82

(1936).

'Cutler Corporation .v. Latshaw, 374 Pa. 1, 97 A.2d. 234 (1953); Ahern v. Standard Realty
Co., 267 Pa. 404, 110 Aft. 141 (1920); Ansley v. George Coal Co., 88 Pa. Super. 40 (1926);
Griffin Oil Co. v. Toms, 170 Pa. Super. 203, 85 A.2d. 595 (1952); Stewart v. Lawson, 181 Pa.
549, 37 At. 518 (1897); Rambo B. & L. Assn. v. Dragone, 305 Pa. 24, 156 Atd. 311 (1931).
5 Landow v. Bailinger, 313 Pa. 385, 169 Ad. 780 (1934); Shultz v. Burlock, 6 Pa. Super. 573
(1898); Koruzo v. Ritenauer, 101 Pa. Super. 558 (1930). In Consolidated Ice Manufacturing Co.
v. Blomer, 18 Pa. Super. 451 (1901), the facts differed because the defendant did not sign under

the main obligation of the bonds.
ep. L. 334, PURDON'S PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 739 (1953 ed.).
I The pertinent part of the Act of 1806 provides: "Itshall be the duty of the prothonotary
of any court of record, within this commonwealth, on the application of any person, being the
original holder (or assignee of such holder) of a note, bond, or other instrument of writing
containing a warrant for an attorney at law, or other person, to confess judgment, to enter judgment
against the person or persons who executed the same .. ....
(Emphasis added.)
8 365 Pa. 586, 76 A.2d. 179 (1950).
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holding that the signature authorizing the warrant must directly refer to
the power,' but the wording of the act does not require such a holding.
Much of the prior case law concerning the validity of warrants to confess
judgment has arisen where the assignee of a lease or his assignor defaults on
his payments. In Stewart v. Lawson,'0 the defendant-assignee, Lawson, went
into possession under Jackson, Stewart's lessee and defendant's assignor. Jackson defaulted and Stewart confessed judgment against Lawson. Lawson did
not sign the warrant in the original lease, but Stewart contended that by entering into the assignment Lawson subjected himself to all the provisions in the
original lease, including the warrant to confess judgment. The court, however,
stated that since Lawson had not signed the warrant, his mere entry as an
assignee did not give anyone authority to confess judgment against him. In
Ahern v. Standard Realty Co." and in Ansley v. George Coal Co.," the defendants-assignees executed agreements with the lessors stating, in effect, that
assignees assumed all rights and remedies of the original leases. The original
leases contained warrants to confess judgment. In both cases the assignees
were held not bound to the warrant because the references to them were too
general.
The policy behind the rule requiring references to confession warrants to
be specific, evolved from this prior case law and culminating in the Frantz
case, represents a concession to those in inferior bargaining positions. A warrant to confess judgment is a powerful instrument. The signer in most cases
deprives himself of every defense and every delay of execution. He usually
waives the exemption of his personal property from levy and sale under the
exemption laws. He puts his cause in the hands of a hostile party. The
conclusion that his express and specific assent to such a provision must clearly
appear in the instrument is almost mandatory. The signer ordinarily is not
aware of the effects of a warrant of attorney to confess judgment until he finds
himself trapped in hostile hands with little likelihood of escape.
It may be objected that the refusal to recognize a warrant in an agreement
is not only directly contrary to general contract principles whereby signers are
bound by the terms in the agreement, but also an unconstitutional impairment
of contract obligations. One answer to the former objection is that a warrant
is an extraordinary power; without a specific reference to it, it can be assumed
that such a term is not in the contemplation of the signer, and the other party
9See, e.g., cases cited in notes 2 and 3 supra.
10 181 Pa. 549, 37 Atd. 518 (1897).
1 267 Pa. 404, 110 At. 141 (1920).
1"88 Pa. Super. 40 (1926).
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should know this. It is further submitted, although the Frantz case makes no
direct reference to it, that where an offer is so framed as to mislead the offeree
as to its full impact, the misleading provisions of the offer will be ignored.
The effect of illegible terms or those appearing in fine type is stated in Williston
on Contracts, as follows:
".. . if the terms of a document are not fairly legible, the acceptance of
it does not involve assent to its terms unless they are actually known. This
qualification is applicable where the terms are printed in too fine type, . . ." 13
Moreover, an analogy can be made to cases where a carrier or other bailee tries
to limit his liability by provisions on the reverse side, or in fine print on the
face side, of tickets and claim checks. It is generally held that if the bailor
has no knowledge of these provisions he is not bound by them.1" On the basis
of the above discussion, therefore, it can be said that the warrant was never a
part of the agreement in the first place. The constitutional objection is dispensed with in that if the warrant were not a term of the contract in the first
place, then there never was any contractual obligation to be impaired. Therefore, the Frantz decision does not violate contract principles, but rather attempts
to limit the effective creation of a warrant of attorney to confess judgment.
There remains the question of under what circumstances will a warrant
contained in an agreement be deemed effective. In the Frantz opinion it is
stated that a warrant not contained in the body of the agreement is not binding
unless it is signed where the warrant appears. The opinion, however, further
states:
"The rule to be deduced from the decisions is that a warrant of attorney to
confess judgment must be self-sustaining; to be self-sustaining the warrant
must be in writing and signed by the person to be bound by it; and the requisite signature must bear a direct relation to the warrant and may not be implied
extrinsically nor imputed from assignment of the instrument containing the
warrant." (Emphasis added.)
Note that what is required is a "direct relation" between the signature and the
warrant. It would appear, therefore, that there are two safe methods of creating an effective warrant contained in the agreement. One is to sign the warrant
itself wherever it may appear; the other is to have a specific reference to
the warrant clause appear directly over or under the signature. Since the controlling question is whether the signer has unmistakably indicated his assent
to the warrant, any other method will probably be ineffective. The fact that
18 I WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 90, p. 271 (Rev. ed. 1936).
14 Verner v. Sweitzer, 32 Pa. 208 (1858); Princell v. Pickwick Greyhound Lines, 262 ii!. App.
Also see BROWN, PPRSONA. PROPERTY § 84, p. 301 (1st. ed. 1936).
298 (1931).
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the warrant clause is near the end of the agreement or that there is a recital
next to the signature that the signer has read thoroughly and fully understands
all the terms of the instrument does not seem to create a direct relation to the
warrant itself. Under such conditions there still exists the possibility of a
"legal ambush"." It should also be remembered that this extraordinary power
will be strictly construed against the party who seeks to enforce the confession
16
of judgment.
In conclusion, what the Frantz case has done is to extend the protection
given to signers of agreements containing clauses authorizing the adverse party
to confess judgment against the signer. It is recognized, in a state such as
Pennsylvania where garnishment of wages is forbidden, that a warrant of attorney to confess judgment is a worthwhile remedy." Moreover, it serves as
a security device and also can save time and expense. The strength of this
plenary power, however, must operate within limits. The fact that at least
seventeen states do not allow a confession of judgment before the commencement of a suit demonstrates the power of such a warrant. 8 As the Cutler case '"
stated, one who draws up a warrant within "fine print" clauses is like Caligula,
who put the laws on pillars so high that the people could not read them. It is
a sense of fairness that requires the strength of this powerful legal weapon
embodied in the warrant clause to be effecitvely reduced.
CODY

H.

BROOKS.

25 See Cutler Corporation v. Latshaw, 374 Pa. 1, 97 A.2d. 234 (1953).
16See Rambo B. & L. Assn. v. Dragone, 305 Pa. 24, 156 Ad. 311 (1931).
17 Act of April 15, 1845, P. L. 459, § 5, PURDON'S PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 886 (1930).
18 The states are Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Kentucky, Massa.
chusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, New Jersey, New Mexico, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont,
West Virginia.
19374 Pa. 1, 97 A.2d. 234 (1953).

